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**IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT ANCHORAGE**

SCOTT A. KOHLHAAS, THE
ALASKAN INDEPENDENCE
PARTY, ROBERT M. BIRD, and
KENNETH P. JACOBUS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF ALASKA; STATE OF
ALASKA DIVISION OF
ELECTIONS; LIEUTENANT
GOVERNOR KEVIN MEYER, in his
official capacity as Supervisor of
Elections; and GAIL FENUMIAI, in
her official capacity of Director of the
Division of Elections,

Defendants,

ALASKANS FOR BETTER
ELECTIONS, INC.,

Intervenor.

Case No. 3AN-20-09532 CI

STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. Introduction

In the 2020 general election, Alaska voters approved Ballot Measure 2, an initiative implementing sweeping reform of Alaska's election laws.¹ In early December

¹ See Exhibit A. The sponsors dubbed the initiative "the Better Elections Initiative" and it was designated 19AKBE by the Division of Elections. For simplicity, the State will refer to the initiative as Ballot Measure 2 in this memorandum, even though its provisions have since become law.

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1 2020, three individuals—Scott Kohlhaas, Robert Bird, and Kenneth Jacobus—and the
2 Alaska Independence Party (collectively, “Kohlhaas”) sued the State of Alaska, the
3 Alaska Division of Elections, the Lieutenant Governor and the Director of Elections
4 (collectively, “the State”) alleging that certain provisions of Ballot Measure 2—
5 specifically the introduction of an open, nonpartisan primary and ranked-choice voting
6 for the general election—violated their state and federal constitutional rights and failed
7 to comply with Article III, sections 3 and 8 of the Alaska Constitution. Because no
8 elections have yet been held under the terms of Ballot Measure 2, this is a facial
9 constitutional challenge appropriate for summary judgment.
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12 The State now moves for summary judgment on all claims. Ballot Measure 2
13 does nothing whatsoever to impact many of the constitutional rights mentioned in the
14 complaint. The complaint’s only arguable claims of infringement—that the nonpartisan
15 primary violates voters’ and parties’ freedom of association and that ranked choice
16 voting violates the right to equal protection and the principle of one person, one vote—
17 fail because they rest on a misunderstanding of what Ballot Measure 2 actually does.
18 And Ballot Measure 2 complies with Article III, sections 3 and 8 of the Alaska
19 Constitution, neither of which dictates the use of a particular type of voting system. The
20 Court should therefore grant summary judgment to the State.
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1 **II. Facts**

2 **A. After signature gathering and litigation, Ballot Measure 2 appeared**
3 **on the 2020 general election ballot and passed.**

4 In July 2019, Alaskans for Better Elections filed initiative application 19AKBE
5 with the Division of Elections. 19AKBE, which became Ballot Measure 2, had three
6 principal components: it added new disclosure and disclaimer requirements to campaign
7 finance law; it replaced the party primary system with an open, nonpartisan primary;
8 and it established ranked-choice voting in the general election. The Lieutenant Governor
9 determined that combining these components in one initiative violated the single-subject
10 rule, and he declined to certify the initiative.² The sponsors sued to challenge that
11 determination.³ The Alaska Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with the Lieutenant
12 Governor, holding that Ballot Measure 2 concerned a single subject: election reform.⁴
13 The Lieutenant Governor then certified the measure and the sponsors collected
14 sufficient signatures to place it on the 2020 general election ballot.⁵

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17 In the 2020 General Election, Alaskan voters approved Ballot Measure 2—with
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22 ² AK Const. art. XI, sec. 2; AS 15.45.080; *Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections*,
23 465 P.3d 477, 479 (Alaska 2020).

24 ³ *See Alaskans for Better Elections v. Meyer*, 3AN-19-09704 CI.

25 ⁴ *Alaskans for Better Elections*, 465 P.3d 477, 499 (Alaska 2020).

26 ⁵ *See* AS 15.45.140(a);
<https://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/initiativepetitionlist.php>

1 174,032 “yes” votes to 170,251 “no” votes.⁶ The law went into effect in February 2021.⁷

2 **B. Ballot Measure 2 fundamentally altered Alaska’s election system.**

3 Ballot Measure 2 fundamentally alters Alaska’s election system by eliminating
4 the state-run primary election to nominate political party candidates and substituting an
5 open, nonpartisan primary election, and by adopting ranked-choice voting for the
6 general election. Although Ballot Measure 2 also increases the transparency of
7 campaigns with new disclosure requirements,⁸ the other two changes—the only ones
8 challenged in this lawsuit—will have a more immediate impact on voters.
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10 **1. Ballot Measure 2 abolished state-run party primaries and**
11 **replaced them with a single, non-partisan, top-four primary.**

12 Ballot Measure 2 abolishes the state’s mandatory primary election and petition
13 process, replacing it with an open, nonpartisan primary system.⁹ Under the old system,
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16 ⁶ See
17 <https://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/20GENR/data/sovc/ElectionSummaryReportRPT24.pdf>. This result was confirmed by a hand recount of all electronically tabulated
18 votes. See
19 <https://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/20GENR/data/sovc/2020BallotMeasure2Audit.pdf>. The hand recount showed 173,929 “yes” votes and 170,183 “no” votes. See *id.*

20 ⁷ Alaska Const. art. XI, § 6 provides, in part, “An initiated law becomes effective
21 ninety days after certification...”

22 ⁸ Ballot Measure 2 modifies Alaska’s campaign finance laws—AS 15.13—by
23 requiring new disclosures. Notably, it requires additional disclosures for contributions
24 of more than \$2000 to independent expenditure groups, which is intended to reveal the
25 “true source” of such contributions, and defines the term “true source.” See Ballot
Measure 2 at §§ 1(2)-(3), 6-7, 9, 14-18. The bill also requires disclaimers on any paid
communications by an independent expenditure group when a majority of the
contributors to the group reside outside Alaska. See Exhibit A at §§ 11-12, 19.

26 ⁹ See Exhibit A at § 20, 72.

1 the Division of Elections provided primary ballots for each recognized political party.¹⁰
2 Generally, voters registered as affiliated with a political party voted that party's ballot,
3 and undeclared and nonpartisan voters chose which party's ballot to vote, all subject to
4 the party's bylaws.¹¹ Candidates selected by this process became their parties' nominees
5 in the general election.¹² Independent candidates—and candidates affiliated with
6 political groups, rather than recognized political parties¹³—accessed the general election
7 ballot by collecting voter signatures on a nominating petition.¹⁴

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9 The new primary system no longer “serve[s] to determine the nominee of a
10 political party or political group but serves only to narrow the number of candidates
11 whose names will appear on the ballot at the general election.”¹⁵ Now, the primary
12 election is open to any candidate, regardless of political affiliation or lack thereof.
13 Those who wish to be candidates in the primary will file a declaration of candidacy.¹⁶ In
14 it, the candidate will either state “the political party or political group with which the
15 candidate is registered as affiliated” or choose to be designated as nonpartisan or
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20 ¹⁰ AS 15.25.010 (amended Feb. 28, 2021).

21 ¹¹ *Id.*; AS 15.25.014 (repealed Feb. 28, 2021).

22 ¹² AS 15.25.100 (repealed and reenacted Feb. 28, 2021).

23 ¹³ See AS 15.80.010(26), defining “political group” as “a group of organized voters
which represents a political program and which does not qualify as a political party.”

24 ¹⁴ See AS 15.25.140 *et seq.* (repealed 2020).

25 ¹⁵ AS 15.25.010.

26 ¹⁶ AS 15.25.030. Candidates may not appear as write-in candidates during the
primary. AS 15.25.070.

1 undeclared.¹⁷

2 The primary ballot will then indicate the candidate's chosen designation, which
3 will be either their registered political affiliation, or nonpartisan or undeclared.¹⁸ For
4 example, a candidate registered with the Alaska Libertarian Party could choose whether
5 to appear on the primary ballot as "Reg. Libertarian," "Nonpartisan," or "Undeclared."¹⁹

6 Primary ballots will also include the following disclaimer:

7
8 A candidate's designated affiliation does not imply that the candidate is
9 nominated or endorsed by the political party or group or that the party or
10 group approves of or associates with that candidate, but only that the
11 candidate is registered as affiliated with the political party or
12 political group.²⁰

13 Voters will then receive a single primary ballot and they will vote for any
14 candidate on the ballot, "without limitations based on the political party or political
15 group affiliation of either the voter or the candidate."²¹ The four candidates receiving
16 the greatest number of votes for an office will advance to the general election,
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20 ¹⁷ AS 15.25.030(a)(5).

21 ¹⁸ AS 15.15.030(5) (describing the requirements for general election ballots); AS
22 15.25.060 (extending those requirements to primary ballots).

23 ¹⁹ See Exhibit B, also available at
24 <https://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/PrimBallotSamp2.pdf>

25 ²⁰ AS 15.15.030(14). If a general election ballot includes candidates for President
26 and Vice-President, the disclaimer will also state, "The election for President and Vice-
President of the United States is different. Some candidates for President and Vice-
President are the official nominees of their political party." AS 15.15.030(15).

²¹ AS 15.15.025.

1 regardless of party affiliation.²² Accordingly, the candidates in the general election may
2 be registered as affiliated with a political party, but they will not be the nominees of any
3 political party. Candidates who did not appear on the primary ballot or who did not
4 advance out of the primary may also file as write-in candidates in the general election.²³
5

6 In the general election, candidates will again appear on the ballot with their
7 selected designation.²⁴ Like the primary ballot, the general election ballot will also
8 clearly explain that although the candidates may be registered as affiliated with a certain
9 political party or group, that does not mean they are nominated, endorsed, or approved
10 by that political party or group.²⁵
11

12 **2. Ballot Measure 2 introduced ranked-choice voting in the**
13 **general election.**

14 Ballot Measure 2's final reform makes ranked-choice voting the means of
15 expressing voters' preferences during the general election.²⁶ Ranked-choice voting is
16 also used by the state of Maine for federal elections²⁷ and by some U.S. cities, including
17 New York, Minneapolis, and San Francisco.²⁸ Under Alaska's previous voting
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19 ²² AS 15.25.100(a). If the fourth-place candidates tie, the candidate to advance will
20 be determined by lot. AS 15.25.100(b), (g) (citing AS 15.20.530).

21 ²³ AS 15.25.105.

22 ²⁴ AS 15.15.030(5).

23 ²⁵ AS 15.15.030(14); *see* Exhibit C, also available at
<https://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/GenRCVballotSamp2.pdf>

24 ²⁶ AS 15.15.350(c).

25 ²⁷ Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 723-A.

26 ²⁸ New York City, N.Y., Charter § 1057-g; Minneapolis Code of Ordinances
167.60; San Francisco, CA Charter 13.102.

1 system—which will still be used in the new nonpartisan primary election—voters’
2 preference is expressed as a single choice for their most favored candidate. In a ranked-
3 choice voting system, voters instead rank the candidates in order of preference, and the
4 Division counts the preferences in a series of rounds.²⁹ As with single-choice voting,
5 each ballot counts for one vote per race, and the candidate with the greatest number of
6 votes—now expressed as ranked preferences—in the final round of counting will win.³⁰

8 On a ranked-choice ballot, voters will rank the candidates by filling in the ovals
9 that correspond to the available rankings.³¹ Voters may choose to rank only one
10 candidate, or they may choose to rank two or more candidates, but they may not give
11 the same ranking to multiple candidates.³² A voter’s “vote” consists of the voter’s full
12 set of preferences among the candidates.

14 For example, in an election with four candidates—like that contemplated by
15 Ballot Measure 2—voters will be able to express their views of the candidates by
16 ranking them first, second, third, and fourth. In fact, because voters will still be
17 permitted to write-in a candidate’s name, there will actually be five rankings. Some
18 voters, however, may not have a preference between all of the candidates, and such
19 voters will be free, for example, to rank their first and second choice but—having no
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23 ²⁹ See AS 15.15.350

24 ³⁰ *Id.*; AS 15.15.350(d) (directing the Division to count “each validly cast ballot as one vote”).

25 ³¹ AS 15.15.360(a)(1); *see* Exhibit C.

26 ³² AS 15.15.350(g)(2); AS 15.15.360(a)(3).

1 preference between the other two candidates or a hypothetical write-in—list no third,
2 fourth or fifth choice ranking. Other voters, not having any preference for a candidate
3 other than their first choice candidate, can rank that preferred candidate first and not
4 rank any of the others. In each case, the voter's vote expresses the full range of their
5 views about the candidates.
6

7 When counting the ballots, the Division will initially count the number of first-
8 choice rankings each candidate received.³³ If a candidate receives more than half of all
9 the first-choice rankings, the process is complete and that candidate is the winner.³⁴ If
10 the initial count does not reveal the winner, the Division will eliminate the candidate
11 with the fewest first-choice rankings.³⁵ The ballots of voters who ranked the now-
12 eliminated candidate first will no longer count for that candidate, but will instead be
13 counted for the voters' second-ranked candidate.³⁶ If a voter has not expressed a
14 preference among the remaining candidates, that voter's vote will count for the
15 eliminated candidate in the final results, and the voter's ballot is not included in further
16 rounds of tabulation.³⁷ If only two candidates remain after a candidate is eliminated, the
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21 ³³ AS 15.15.350(d). If a voter did not fill in the first-choice oval, the Division will
22 count that voter's highest-ranked candidate as the voter's first choice. *Id.* ("highest-
23 ranked continuing candidate").

24 ³⁴ AS 15.15.350(d).

25 ³⁵ AS 15.15.350(d)(2). If two candidates tie for the fewest first-choice rankings, the
26 loser is determined by drawing lots. AS 15.15.350(e)(3).

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ AS 15.15.350(d)(2), .350(g)(2).

1 candidate with the greatest number of votes is the winner.³⁸ If more than two candidates
2 remain, the process repeats until only two candidates are left and one of those
3 candidates wins.³⁹ Ranked-choice voting is sometimes referred to as “instant runoff
4 voting,” because it allows voters to express their preferences among candidates on a
5 single ballot, and those preferences are used to identify the winning candidate in
6 successive rounds of counting —*i.e.* “instantly”—rather than having one or more runoff
7 elections to winnow the field of candidates.
8

9 **C. Kohlhaas sued, bringing a facial challenge to the constitutionality of**
10 **Ballot Measure 2.**

11 Kohlhaas filed suit on December 1, 2020,⁴⁰ and amended his complaint several
12 times. His Second Amended Complaint alleges that Ballot Measure 2 violates multiple
13 provisions of the federal and state constitutions.⁴¹ Specifically, he alleges that the open,
14 nonpartisan primary violates his right to free political association by “prevent[ing
15 political parties] from selecting their candidates and having their candidates
16 meaningfully identified on the ballots.”⁴² He also alleges that ranked-choice voting
17 violates the “principle of ‘one person, one vote,’” because it requires voters to rank
18 multiple candidates or “lose their right to vote,” and because it may not lead to “a
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21 ³⁸ AS 15.15.350(d)(1).

22 ³⁹ *Id.* If the last two candidates tie, even after the Division conducts a recount, the
23 winner will be determined by lot. AS 15.15.350(e)(3) (citing AS 15.15.460, AS
15.20.430-.530).

24 ⁴⁰ Compl. at p.9.

25 ⁴¹ *See e.g.*, Second Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 11-14.

26 ⁴² *Id.* at ¶ 13.

majority result.”⁴³ Further, he claims that Ballot Measure 2 has a “disparate impact on Alaska Native and rural communities.”⁴⁴ Finally, he claims that the “election system implemented by [Ballot Measure] 2 violates” Article III, §§ 3 and 8 of the Alaska Constitution and “is void as it applies to the election of the governor and lieutenant governor.”⁴⁵ Along with these potential constitutional claims, he argues that Ballot Measure 2 is not severable because of *Alaskans for Betters Elections v. Meyer*, where the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the measure complies with the single-subject rule despite its three major reforms.⁴⁶ He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.⁴⁷

III. Legal standard

“A party raising a constitutional challenge to a statute bears the burden of demonstrating the constitutional violation. A presumption of constitutionality applies, and doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.”⁴⁸ “The analysis of a constitutional provision begins with, and remains grounded in, the words of the provision itself,” the court is “not vested with the authority to add missing terms or hypothesize differently worded provisions ... to reach a particular result.”⁴⁹ Rather, the court “look[s] to the

⁴³ *Id.* at ¶ 14.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at ¶ 19.

⁴⁵ *Id.* at ¶ 24.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at ¶ 20.

⁴⁷ *Id.* at p.9.

⁴⁸ *State v. Andrade*, 23 P.3d 58, 71 (Alaska 2001) (quoting *Baxley v. State*, 958 P.2d 422, 428 (Alaska 1998)).

⁴⁹ *Wielechowski v. State*, 403 P.3d 1141, 1146 (Alaska 2017) (quoting *Hickel v. Cowper*, 874 P.2d 922, 927-28 (Alaska 1994)).

1 intent of the framers”⁵⁰ and “adopt[s] the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of
2 precedent, reason, and policy.”⁵¹

3 Kohlhaas’s complaint makes a facial challenge to Ballot Measure 2, because no
4 election has yet been held pursuant to its requirements.⁵² Courts “uphold a statute
5 against a facial constitutional challenge if ‘despite occasional problems it might create
6 in its application to specific cases, [it] has a plainly legitimate sweep.’”⁵³ Moreover, a
7 facial challenge is especially appropriate for resolution on summary judgment—because
8 there are no facts regarding the application of the statute to dispute and “[s]ummary
9 judgment is proper if there is no genuine factual dispute and the moving party is entitled
10 to judgment as a matter of law.”⁵⁴

13 Alaska courts and federal courts apply essentially the same balancing test to
14 evaluate constitutional challenges to state election laws.⁵⁵ The court first determines

17 ⁵⁰ *Thomas v. Rosen*, 569 P.2d 793, 795 (Alaska 1977) (citing *Warren v. Boucher*,
18 543 P.2d 731, 735 (Alaska 1975)).

19 ⁵¹ *Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz*, 170 P.3d 183, 192 (Alaska 2007).

20 ⁵² *See e.g., Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party*, 552
21 U.S. 442, 455-56 (2008) (noting that challenge to Washington initiative creating a
22 nonpartisan primary was facial challenge with no evidentiary record to support
23 speculation about implementation or possible voter confusion).

24 ⁵³ *State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska*, 171 P.3d 577, 581 (Alaska 2007)
25 (quoting *Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage*, 91 P.3d 252, 260 n.14 (Alaska 2004)).

26 ⁵⁴ *Devine v. Great Divide Ins. Co.*, 350 P.3d 782, 785-86 (Alaska 2015).

⁵⁵ *State, Div. of Elections v. Green Party of Alaska (Green Party of Alaska I)*, 118
P.3d 1054, 1060 (Alaska 2005) (explicitly adopting federal test for “evaluating whether
[a] challenged election law violates the Alaska Constitution.”); *Eu v. San Francisco Cty.*
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989).

whether the plaintiff has asserted a constitutional right.⁵⁶ The court then weighs “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . against the precise interests put forward by the State”⁵⁷ Lastly, the court judges the “fit between the challenged legislation and the state’s interests.”⁵⁸ The more severe the burden on the constitutional rights, the more compelling the state’s interests must be and the closer the fit between the interest and the law.⁵⁹ “When a state electoral provision places no heavy burden on associational rights, ‘a State’s important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.’”⁶⁰

IV. Argument

Kohlhaas claims that Ballot Measure 2 violates a host of rights, including the rights of “free political association, political expression, free speech, free assembly, and to petition the government for redress of grievances”⁶¹ under the U.S. Constitution, and “to free speech, to assemble, to petition the government for redress of grievances, and to

⁵⁶ *Green Party of Alaska I*, 118 P.3d at 1061.

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 1059 (quoting *Burdick v. Takushi*, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 1061.

⁵⁹ *Id.*; see also, *State v. Alaska Democratic Party*, 426 P.3d 901, 907 (Alaska 2018) (“This is a flexible test: as the burden on constitutionally protected rights becomes more severe, the government interest must be more compelling and the fit between the challenged legislation and the state’s interest must be closer.”)

⁶⁰ *Clingman v. Beaver*, 544 U.S. 581, 593 (2005) (citing *Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party*, 520 U.S. 351, 351 (1997)).

⁶¹ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 11.

1 privacy” under the Alaska Constitution.⁶² But his complaint does not explain how Ballot
2 Measure 2 affects many of these rights at all, much less unconstitutionally burdens
3 them. This memorandum focuses on the only claims that the complaint elucidates: that
4 the nonpartisan primary infringes on voters’ and parties’ freedom of association and that
5 ranked-choice voting violates the right to equal protection and the principle of one
6 person, one vote.
7

8 These claims rest primarily on Kohlhaas’s failure to understand what Ballot
9 Measure 2 actually does. His challenges to the new primary election fail to recognize
10 that it is not a vehicle for selecting political party nominees, but rather the first stage of
11 a two-stage election in which party candidates compete equally with independent or
12 nonpartisan candidates. Although free association principles limit the ways in which a
13 state may control *political parties’* nomination processes, under Ballot Measure 2 the
14 State will no longer play any part in how political parties choose nominees. Thus, the
15 new system does not substantially burden the parties’ or voters’ associational rights; and
16 any minimal burden it may impose is easily justified by the State’s interests.
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19 Similarly, Kohlhaas’s claims about ranked-choice voting misunderstand how the
20 new ballot tabulating system works. Because each voter casts only a single vote—which
21 ranks all the candidates—and each voter has the same opportunity to rank as many
22 candidates as they want, ranked-choice voting does not violate the principle of one-
23 person, one-vote or any other constitutional right.
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26 ⁶² Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 12.

1 Finally, Kohlhaas's claim that Ballot Measure 2 violates Article III, §§ 3 and 8 of
2 the Alaska Constitution also lacks merit. Because Ballot Measure 2's tabulation process
3 results in winning candidates who have received "the greatest number of votes," it
4 complies with Article III, §§ 3 and 8.

6 **A. Ballot Measure 2's nonpartisan primary does not violate political
7 parties' associational right to choose their nominees.**

8 The right to free political association is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
9 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the Alaska Constitution.⁶³ It
10 "guarantees the rights of people, and political parties, to associate together to achieve
11 their political goals."⁶⁴ "[A] corollary of [this] right to associate is the right not to
12 associate."⁶⁵ Accordingly, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
13 Constitution, state election laws may not contravene party rules by allowing non-
14 members to vote on the party's nominees⁶⁶ or by preventing non-members from voting
15 on the party's nominees.⁶⁷ Nor may states prohibit a party's governing body from
16 endorsing the party's nominees.⁶⁸ Similarly, under the Alaska Constitution, the State
17 may not prevent parties from selecting their nominees using a two-party ballot⁶⁹ or
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21 ⁶³ See *Alaska Democratic Party*, 426 P.3d at 906–7.

22 ⁶⁴ *Id.* at 906. (Emphasis omitted).

23 ⁶⁵ *California Democratic Party v. Jones*, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).

24 ⁶⁶ *Id.* at 586.

25 ⁶⁷ *Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut*, 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986).

26 ⁶⁸ *Eu*, 489 U.S. at 229.

⁶⁹ *Green Party of Alaska I*, 118 P.3d at 1070.

1 prohibit non-members from running for a party's nomination.⁷⁰

2 But no precedent supports Kohlhaas's claim that Ballot Measure 2's open,
3 nonpartisan primary burdens these associational rights. To the contrary, the United
4 States Supreme Court has held that open, nonpartisan primaries are constitutional.⁷¹ In
5 *Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party*, the Court considered a
6 successful voter initiative in Washington that created a primary nearly identical to that
7 created by Ballot Measure 2.⁷² In it, candidates appeared on a single primary ballot,
8 where they were designated by their chosen "major or minor party preference, or
9 independent status."⁷³ The top two candidates advanced to the general election,
10 regardless of the party affiliation of the voter or the candidates.⁷⁴ Regulations explained
11 that the primary "does not serve to determine the nominees of a political party but
12 serves to winnow the number of candidates to a final list of two for the general
13 election."⁷⁵

14 ⁷⁰ *Alaska Democratic Party*, 426 P.3d at 915.

15 ⁷¹ *Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 459. *See also*, *California Democratic*
16 *Party*, 530 U.S. at 585–86 (Noting, in *dicta*, that a nonpartisan primary "has all the
17 characteristics of the partisan blanket primary, save the constitutionally crucial one:
18 Primary voters are not choosing a party's nominee. Under a nonpartisan blanket
19 primary, a State may ensure more choice, greater participation, increased "privacy," and
20 a sense of "fairness"—all without severely burdening a political party's First
21 Amendment right of association.")

22 ⁷² *Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 447.

23 ⁷³ *Id.* (quoting Wash. Rev.Code § 29A.24.030 (repealed 2004)).

24 ⁷⁴ *Id.*

25 ⁷⁵ *Id.* at 453 (quoting Wash. Admin. Code § 434-262-012 (repealed)) (internal
26 quotation marks omitted).

1 The party challenging the initiative argued this open, nonpartisan primary
2 violated its right to political association by “usurping its right to nominate its own
3 candidates and by forcing it to associate with candidates it does not endorse.”⁷⁶ The
4 Court found this argument had a “fatal flaw:” Washington’s system did not select the
5 party’s nominees, so it did not severely burden the party’s right of political
6 association.⁷⁷ “The essence of nomination—the choice of a party representative—does
7 not occur” in an open, nonpartisan primary.⁷⁸ Thus, the state did not usurp the party’s
8 right to select its own candidates; parties could still nominate candidates “by whatever
9 mechanism they choose,” and whether they did so “outside the state-run primary is
10 simply irrelevant.”⁷⁹

13 Kohlhaas’ political association claim here suffers from the same fatal flaw: Just
14 like Washington’s primary, Alaska’s open, nonpartisan primary will not select party
15 nominees. And Ballot Measure 2, like Washington’s laws and regulations, clearly states
16 that the primary will not “serve to determine the nominee of a political party or political
17 group but serves only to narrow the number of candidates”⁸⁰ The general election
18 candidates, therefore, will not be the nominees of the Republican, Alaska Libertarian, or
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22 ⁷⁶ *Id.* at 448.

23 ⁷⁷ *Id.* at 453–54. 458.

24 ⁷⁸ *Id.* at 453.

25 ⁷⁹ *Id.*

26 ⁸⁰ AS 15.25.010.

1 Alaskan Independence parties, as Kohlhaas suggests.⁸¹ If these parties wish to nominate
2 candidates in advance of the primary election, they are free to do so.⁸² Indeed, the
3 parties currently select their nominees for president and vice president without state
4 involvement, so they are perfectly capable of doing this.⁸³

5
6 Kohlhaas suggests that a political party has a “right to nominate its candidates in
7 accord with its party rules and principles.”⁸⁴ But he conflates that right with the right to
8 a *state-run* nominating process—something that neither the state nor federal constitution
9 provides. The First Amendment protects parties’ and voters’ associational interests from
10 state interference, but it does not simultaneously require states to involve themselves in
11 parties’ nomination processes. In other words, if a state decides to require political
12 parties to nominate their candidates through a state-run primary election, it cannot
13 restrict parties’ and voters’ ability to freely associate with each other in that primary
14 election. But nothing in the state or federal constitutions requires that a state involve
15 itself in political parties’ nomination of candidates in the first place.
16

17
18 *State v. Alaska Democratic Party* does not suggest otherwise, even though the
19 Alaska Supreme Court characterized the associational right at issue in that case as the
20

21 ⁸¹ See Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 2 ([Republican] Party’s candidate”), 3
22 (“Libertarian candidate”), 4 (“[Alaskan Independence Party] candidate”). At least,
23 although the general election candidates *may be* the nominees of their political parties—
if parties choose to nominate candidates in some other way—they will not be the
nominees by virtue of their victory in the primary election.

24 ⁸² *Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 453.

25 ⁸³ See AS 15.30.020.

26 ⁸⁴ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 7.

1 party's "right to choose its general election nominees."⁸⁵ Taken out of context, this
2 language could be read to suggest that political parties have a constitutional right to
3 nominate candidates who will appear on the general election ballot. But this is incorrect.
4 The Court's language merely described the political parties' rights in the context of the
5 existing statutory scheme, which required them to nominate candidates through state-
6 run party primary elections.⁸⁶ The Court did not decide—because the question was not
7 before it—that political parties have a right to a state-run primary election or guaranteed
8 access to the general election ballot. No legal authority supports either proposition.
9

10 First, party primaries are creatures of statute, not the constitution. Nothing in the
11 federal or state constitution requires the State either to hold a primary election or to
12 provide a means by which political parties select the candidates they will support for
13 elective office.⁸⁷ In fact, during the Alaska constitutional convention debates Delegate
14 Victor Rivers explained that the constitution did not provide the means for nominating
15 candidates because the delegates intended to leave flexibility for future changes:
16

17 *There might not always be a primary.* There might be some time when
18 nominating conventions will be reverted to as they are in some states. So
19 if we pinpointed the matter of a primary in this thing, we might then pin
20 down the type of the nominating elections we would have in the state for
21 all time to come.⁸⁸

22 ⁸⁵ *Alaska Democratic Party*, 426 P.3d at 909.

23 ⁸⁶ *See* AS 15.25.010 *et seq.* (repealed Feb. 28, 2021).

24 ⁸⁷ *See California Democratic Party*, 530 U.S. at 585-86 (seeing noting
25 constitutional problem with a nonpartisan blanket primary).

26 ⁸⁸ Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention (Jan. 13, 1956) at 2044-45.
(Emphasis added).

1 Second, it is well-established that the State may impose reasonable requirements
2 to limit access to the general election ballot.⁸⁹ And Ballot Measure 2 creates a system
3 that is *more* accessible, not less, because anyone may file to run in the open, nonpartisan
4 primary that it creates.⁹⁰ Although only the top four candidates advance to the general
5 election, independent candidates and minor political parties will have to expend much
6 less effort and resources to file for the primary election. And a candidate who is not
7 among the top four most popular candidates in the primary election is unlikely to have
8 much chance in the general election. Thus, Kohlhaas's claim that minor political parties
9 will be harmed by the open nonpartisan primary⁹¹ makes little sense.
10

11
12 Thus, *Alaska Democratic Party* stands only for the proposition that the parties
13 may control which voters and candidates can participate in any state-run party primary
14 that serves to choose the party's nominees, not that the party has a right to access the
15 general election ballot even if its nominees do not prevail in the nonpartisan primary
16 election. In a system where the State is not participating in the parties' selection of their
17 nominees, the State cannot be burdening the parties' right to select nominees.
18

19 Here, Alaska voters, exercising their constitutional right to "enact laws by
20 initiative" and relying on the State's "broad power" to regulate elections for federal and
21

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23
24 ⁸⁹ See *State, Div. of Elections v. Metcalfe*, 110 P.3d 976 (Alaska 2005); *Green
Party of Alaska v. State, Div. of Elections*, 147 P.3d 728 (Alaska 2006).

25 ⁹⁰ See AS 15.25.030.

26 ⁹¹ See Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 15.

1 state offices, have changed state law to eliminate partisan primaries.⁹² Kohlhaas has no
2 right to state-run primaries that select party nominees, so eliminating these primaries
3 and establishing open, nonpartisan primaries does not infringe on his right to political
4 association or any other constitutional right.⁹³ Whether the parties choose to conduct
5 their own primaries is “simply irrelevant” to their political association claim.⁹⁴
6

7 Because the open, nonpartisan primary will not select party nominees, it “does
8 not impose any severe burden” on Kohlhaas’s right to political association.⁹⁵ The State,
9 therefore, needs only an important regulatory interest to justify it.⁹⁶ Section 1 of Ballot
10 Measure 2 lays out the “Findings and Intent” behind the initiative, declaring:
11

12 It is in the public interest of Alaska to adopt a primary election system that
13 is open and nonpartisan, which will generate more qualified and
14 competitive candidates for elected office, boost voter turnout, better
15 reflect the will of the electorate, reward cooperation, and reduce
16 partisanship among elected officials.

17 Boosting voter turnout and holding elections that better reflect the will of the electorate
18 are plainly important regulatory interests that easily justify the use of a nonpartisan
19 blanket primary.
20

21 The State also has an interest in effectuating the people’s vote to eliminate
22

23 ⁹² AK Const., Art. 11, § 1; *see also Tashjian*, 479 U.S. 217 (citing U.S. Const. art.
24 I, § 4, cl. 1)).

25 ⁹³ *Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 453, n.7.

26 ⁹⁴ *Id.* Notably, if the parties do conduct party primaries, they do not have “a right to
have their nominees designated as such on the ballot.” *Id.* at 453 n.7.

⁹⁵ *Id.* at 458.

⁹⁶ *Id.*

1 partisan primaries. By passing Ballot Measure 2, Alaska voters decided to “get rid of the
2 party primary system” that currently existed.⁹⁷ Kohlhaas suggests that the State and its
3 voters were motivated by a desire to render political parties “irrelevant.”⁹⁸ But political
4 parties remain relevant, because they are free to nominate and endorse candidates, and
5 under Alaska’s campaign finance laws, they are permitted to make and receive larger
6 political contributions than individuals or other groups.⁹⁹ And the State and its voters
7 have a valid interest in reducing the role parties play in primaries by establishing a
8 nonpartisan primary system.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, the State has no valid interest in *protecting*
9 political parties from competition.¹⁰¹ The State, therefore, has a sufficient interest in
10 changing its primary system, and Ballot Measure 2 is constitutional.
11

12 The state constitution, although “more protective of political parties’
13 associational interests than is the federal constitution,” does not demand a different
14 result.¹⁰² The cases in which the Alaska Supreme Court has found the state constitution
15 more protective of associational rights are distinguishable in ways that make them
16
17
18

19 ⁹⁷ Ballot Measure 2 Ballot Language,
20 [https://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/19AKBE/19AKBE%20-](https://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/19AKBE/19AKBE%20-%20Ballot%20Language%20Summary.pdf)
21 [%20Ballot%20Language%20Summary.pdf](https://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/19AKBE/19AKBE%20-%20Ballot%20Language%20Summary.pdf).

22 ⁹⁸ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 13.

23 ⁹⁹ See AS 15.13.070.

24 ¹⁰⁰ See *Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 453.

25 ¹⁰¹ *Green Party of Alaska I*, 118 P.3d at 1068 (quoting *Clingman*, 544 U.S. at 609
26 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (“States do not have a valid interest in . . . protecting the major
parties from competition . . .”).

¹⁰² *Alaska Democratic Party*, 426 P.3d at 909.

1 inapposite here. In two companion cases, both titled *Vogler v. Miller*, the Court held the
2 Alaska Constitution precluded ballot access restrictions that would have passed muster
3 under the federal constitution because they were too strict for purposes of the Alaska
4 Constitution.¹⁰³ But Ballot Measure 2 opens the new nonpartisan primary to all-comers
5 and thus imposes no burden on ballot access whatsoever.
6

7 The Court has also departed from federal precedent to hold that parties and
8 voters are significantly burdened when voters are forced to register with a party in order
9 to vote for the party's nominees or run for the party's nomination.¹⁰⁴ But Ballot Measure
10 2 does not impose any comparable obligations on voters, parties, or candidates.
11

12 Thus, there is no reason to believe the state constitution is so protective of the
13 right to political association that it grants Kohlhaas the right to a state-run, closed, and
14 partisan primary, where the federal constitution does not.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, Alaska used to use
15 a "blanket" party primary system in which any voter could vote for any candidate, and
16 the winning candidates becomes the nominees of their parties. And the Alaska Supreme
17 Court held that this blanket primary was constitutional in *O'Callaghan v. State*.¹⁰⁶ Given
18 *O'Callaghan*, which upheld a blanket *partisan* primary, it seems unlikely that the
19
20

21 ¹⁰³ *Vogler v. Miller*, 651 P.2d 1, 4–6 (Alaska 1982); *Vogler v. Miller*, 660 P.2d 1192,
22 1194-95 (Alaska 1983).

23 ¹⁰⁴ *Alaska Democratic Party*, 426 P.3d at 909–10 (citing *Green Party of Alaska I*,
24 118 P.3d at 1065).

25 ¹⁰⁵ *See Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 453.

26 ¹⁰⁶ *O'Callaghan v. State*, 914 P.2d 1250, 1263 (Alaska 1996). Alaska's blanket
primary was abandoned after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down California's blanket
primary in *California Democratic Party*, 530 U.S. at 574.

1 Alaska Supreme Court would invalidate Ballot Measure 2's *nonpartisan* primary, which
2 does not select party nominees. Because Kohlhaas misunderstands this fundamental
3 aspect of open, nonpartisan primaries, his political association claim fails.

4
5 **B. Ballot Measure 2's party preference designations do not violate**
6 **political parties' associational right to choose their nominees.**

7 The Washington initiative considered in *Washington State Grange* implicated the
8 party's freedom of association in only one conceivable way: by allowing candidates to
9 indicate a party preference on the ballot.¹⁰⁷ But the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
10 claim that this forced parties to associate with candidates they did not endorse.
11 Washington's laws and regulations made it clear that the general election candidates
12 were not the nominees of any party.¹⁰⁸ And the Court doubted voters would nevertheless
13 mistakenly believe the candidates were party nominees, holding that a facial challenge
14 cannot survive "on the mere possibility of voter confusion."¹⁰⁹ Having found that
15 Washington's primary did not select party nominees and so did not severely burden
16 associational rights, the Court held that the state's interest in providing relevant
17 information about candidates to voters "easily" justified the inclusion of candidates'
18 party preference on the ballot.¹¹⁰

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22 ¹⁰⁷ *Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 448-49.

23 ¹⁰⁸ *Id.* at 453.

24 ¹⁰⁹ *Id.* at 454 ("There is simply no basis to presume that a well-informed electorate
25 will interpret a candidate's party-preference designation to mean that the candidate is
26 the party's chosen nominee or representative or that the party associates with or
approves of the candidate.").

¹¹⁰ *Id.* at 458.

Kohlhaas thus cannot sustain a facial challenge to Ballot Measure 2 by raising the possibility that voters will confuse a candidate's registered party affiliation for the party's endorsement or nomination.¹¹¹ There is not—and cannot yet be—any evidence of voter confusion. Moreover, Alaskan voters are even less likely to be confused than Washington voters. Unlike the Washington initiative, Ballot Measure 2 requires candidates to be registered with a party if they choose to be designated as affiliated with that party.¹¹² This reduces the possibility that candidates will claim an allegiance to a party with which they have no connection at all.

More importantly, Ballot Measure 2 expressly requires that primary and general election ballots include prominent disclaimers, stating: "A candidate's designated affiliation does not imply that the candidate is nominated or endorsed by the political party or group"¹¹³ Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Alaska Supreme Court have endorsed disclaimers like these as a way to avoid voter confusion.¹¹⁴ Along with

¹¹¹ See *Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 454.

¹¹² *Id.* at 447 ("A political party cannot prevent a candidate who is unaffiliated with, or even repugnant to, the party from designating it as his party of preference."); AS 15.15.030(5) ("If a candidate is registered as affiliated with a political party or political group, the party affiliation, if any, may be designated after the name of the candidate, upon request of the candidate.").

¹¹³ AS 15.15.030(14).

¹¹⁴ *Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 456 (noting voter confusion is unlikely because the "ballot could include prominent disclaimers explaining that party preference reflects only the self-designation of the candidate and not an official endorsement by the party"); *Alaska Democratic Party*, 426 P.3d at 913 (noting voters could be educated by "prominent disclaimers explaining that a candidate's party affiliation denotes only the candidate's voter registration and nothing more").

1 the disclaimer, Alaska's ballots will also indicate that candidates are merely registered
2 with political parties or groups—rather than nominated or endorsed by them—by
3 including “Reg.” before the candidates’ party affiliations.¹¹⁵ These ballot-design
4 measures will be reinforced by the public education campaign Ballot Measure 2 requires
5 the Division to conduct, further reducing the possibility of voter confusion.¹¹⁶
6

7 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Alaska Supreme Court have cast doubt on
8 the argument that party designations will confuse voters into believing that candidates
9 are party nominees, thereby implicating associational rights. The U.S. Supreme Court
10 has recognized that while a candidate’s party designation is a useful “shorthand
11 designation” of the candidate’s views, voters are not easily “misled by party labels.”¹¹⁷
12 Voters instead have the ability “to inform themselves about campaign issues.”¹¹⁸ The
13 Alaska Supreme Court has been “equally confident that Alaska voters would have little
14 trouble understanding and choosing between combined ballots,” which include
15 candidates with multiple party designations, much like nonpartisan primary ballots.¹¹⁹
16 The Alaska Supreme Court has also been confident in the Division’s ability “to design a
17 ballot that voters can understand.”¹²⁰ In *State v. Alaska Democratic Party*, it found “no
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21 ¹¹⁵ See Exhibits B and C.

22 ¹¹⁶ See Exhibit A at § 74.

23 ¹¹⁷ *Tashjian*, 479 U.S. at 220.

24 ¹¹⁸ *Id.* (citing *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 797 (1983)).

25 ¹¹⁹ *State, Div. of Elections v. Green Party of Alaska*, 118 P.3d 1054, 1068 (Alaska
2005).

26 ¹²⁰ *State v. Alaska Democratic Party*, 426 P.3d 901, 913 (Alaska 2018).

1 basis for predicting that Alaska voters will be unable to understand” the distinction
2 between a party’s nominee and a candidate who is merely registered with a particular
3 party.¹²¹

4 Nor do parties have a right to have “their candidates meaningfully identified on
5 the ballots which are provided to the voter,” as Kohlhaas suggests.¹²² Although courts
6 have occasionally invalidated regulations relating to the way candidates are identified
7 on ballots,¹²³ they have done so because those regulations infringed on the “core
8 political speech” of the *candidates* not political parties. And Ballot Measure 2 allows
9 the candidates to identify themselves as registered with a political party or not as they
10 choose. “The First Amendment does not give political parties a right to have their
11 nominees designated as such on the ballot.”¹²⁴ As the Ninth Circuit has noted:

12 “A ballot is a ballot, not a bumper sticker. Cities and states have a legitimate interest in
13 assuring that the purpose of a ballot is not ‘transform[ed] ... from a means of choosing
14 candidates to a billboard for political advertising.’”¹²⁵

15 In the absence of any evidence—or likelihood—of confusion, the State need only
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20 ¹²¹ *Id.*

21 ¹²² See Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 13.

22 ¹²³ See e.g., *Rosen v. Brown*, 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1992) (invalidating regulation
23 prohibiting the political party designation of “Independent” while permitting
24 “Republican” or “Democrat” designations, on basis that party labels designate views
of candidates and the regulations therefore hinder “core political speech.”)

25 ¹²⁴ *Washington State Grange* 552 U.S. at 453 n.7.

26 ¹²⁵ *Rubin v. City of Santa Monica*, 308 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 365).

1 show an important regulatory interest in Ballot Measure 2's provision allowing
2 candidates to identify their party registration status on the ballot. And, like Washington,
3 Alaska has an interest in providing relevant information about candidates, including
4 their registered party affiliation or other chosen designation.¹²⁶ "There can be no
5 question about the legitimacy of [this interest]" and it "easily" justified Washington's
6 primary, so it justifies the nearly identical provision in Ballot Measure 2.¹²⁷
7

8 **C. Ballot Measure 2's ranked-choice voting system does not violate equal**
9 **protection or "one person, one vote."**

10 Kohlhaas claims that the introduction of ranked-choice voting for the general
11 election violates the principle of "one person, one vote," established by the U.S.
12 Supreme Court in a series of redistricting cases in the 1960s.¹²⁸ Not so. Under ranked-
13 choice voting, every voter has the same opportunity to vote—ranking as many or as few
14 candidates as the voter wishes—the voter's "vote" consists of the *rankings as a whole*
15 rather than a series of separate votes for candidates, and every vote is counted through
16 the same process of tabulating the voter's preferences in a series of rounds. At the end
17 of the tabulation, each voter's vote is counted for only one candidate. Thus, ranked-
18 choice voting does not violate equal protection or the principle of one person, one vote.
19

20 Kohlhaas's claims illustrate his confusion over how ranked-choice voting works.
21 First, Kohlhaas alleges that it "require[s] the counting of votes of those who vote for the
22

23 ¹²⁶ *Washington State Grange*, 552 U.S. at 458.

24 ¹²⁷ *Id.* (quoting *Anderson*, 460 U.S. at 796).

25 ¹²⁸ See e.g., *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533
26 (1964).

1 more popular candidates more than once in determining the final result.”¹²⁹ But he also
2 claims that it “allow[s] those voters whose second or lower level votes are assigned to
3 another candidate because their first or other choice was dropped to cast a second or
4 third vote for another candidate.”¹³⁰ In effect then, he complains *both* that voters who
5 prefer candidates who continue through to later rounds of tabulation have their votes
6 counted “more than once,” *and* that voters who prefer less popular candidates—i.e.
7 those who don’t continue to later rounds—get to vote again in the later rounds for other
8 candidates. But these complaints are off-setting, since together they recognize that
9 voters who rank all the candidates have their votes counted in each round of tabulation.
10 Thus, “a first-choice vote for a continuing candidate may compete against a second or
11 third choice of another voter [in later rounds of tabulation], but only one at a time, and
12 each time each voter's vote counts only as a single vote.”¹³¹

13 The Ninth Circuit—in an opinion upholding the constitutionality of San
14 Francisco’s similar system—aptly summarized ranked-choice voting as follows:

15 the option to rank multiple *preferences* is not the same as providing
16 additional *votes*, or more heavily-weighted votes, relative to other votes
17 cast. Each ballot is counted as no more than one vote at each tabulation
18 step, whether representing the voters' first-choice candidate or the voters'
19 second- or third-choice candidate, and each vote attributed to a candidate,
20 whether a first-, second- or third-rank choice, is afforded the same
21 mathematical weight in the election. The ability to rank multiple
22 candidates simply provides a chance to have several preferences recorded

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24 ¹²⁹ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 14.

25 ¹³⁰ *Id.*

26 ¹³¹ *Minnesota Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis*, 766 N.W.2d 683, 692 (Minn. 2009).

1 and counted *sequentially*, not at once.¹³²

2 Voters have only one ballot and only one opportunity to rank the candidates;
3 each voter may express the same number of preferences; all ballots are tabulated
4 according to a single set of rules; and although there may be several steps, or rounds, in
5 the tabulation, no additional votes are cast during the process. Properly understood,
6 then, ranked-choice voting treats voters—and their votes—equally and thus does not
7 violate either the state or federal constitution’s guarantees of equal protection.
8

9 Kohlhaas also alleges that ranked-choice voting “force[s] those voters who
10 support and/or vote for only a single candidate to vote for someone the voters do not
11 support or lose their right to vote when the voters’ single votes are not counted in
12 determining the final result.”¹³³ But a voter who ranks only a first choice candidate and
13 expresses no other preference does not somehow “lose” the right to vote—on the
14 contrary, her vote is counted in determining the final result. If, after the first step in the
15 tabulation, there is no winner, and a voter ranked only one candidate, one of two things
16 will happen: the voter’s preferred candidate is eliminated and the voter’s vote will be
17 shown as a vote for that losing candidate, just as it would be under the old, single-choice
18 voting system. Or, if the voter’s candidate is not eliminated, the voter’s preference for
19 that candidate will continue to count for that candidate in later rounds of tabulation. As
20 the Massachusetts Supreme Court explained in a case examining the City of
21
22
23
24

25 ¹³² *Dudum v. Arntz*, 640 F.3d 1098, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011).

26 ¹³³ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 14.

1 Cambridge's use of ranked choice voting: "[Inactive ballots] too are read and counted;
2 they just do not count toward the election of any of the [ultimately] successful
3 candidates. Therefore it is no more accurate to say that these ballots are not counted
4 than to say that the ballot designating a losing candidate in a two-person, winner-take-
5 all race are not counted."¹³⁴

7 Kohlhaas's final allegation is that ranked choice voting does not "necessarily"
8 guarantee "a majority result."¹³⁵ This is true,¹³⁶ but irrelevant. Neither the federal
9 constitution nor the Alaska Constitution contains a majority threshold requirement for
10 election to office. In contrast, some states require that officeholders must win a majority
11 to be elected, and allow for runoff elections when this threshold is not met.¹³⁷ But no
12 majority is required under the Alaska Constitution; indeed, if it were, the old single-
13 choice voting system with no runoff would be just as unconstitutional.

15 In sum, Kohlhaas's claims reflect a failure to understand the new system, rather
16
17

18 ¹³⁴ *McSweeney v. City of Cambridge*, 665 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Mass. 1996).

19 ¹³⁵ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 14.

20 ¹³⁶ A candidate wins with a majority of the remaining *active* ballots. *See* AS
21 15.15.350. Because inactive ballots are excluded from later rounds of tabulation (and
22 simply count for a now-excluded candidate), if a sufficient number of ballots become
inactive, a candidate with a majority of active ballots might not have a majority of all
the ballots cast in the race.

23 ¹³⁷ *See e.g.*, GA Const. Art. 2, § 2, ¶ 11 (providing for run-off election); GA ST §
24 21-2-501 ("[N]o candidate shall be nominated for public office in any primary or
25 special primary or elected to public office in any election or special election unless such
candidate shall have received a majority of the votes cast to fill such nomination or
public office.")

1 than any genuine constitutional problems with ranked-choice voting, as reflected in the
2 court decisions upholding the constitutionality of this voting system.¹³⁸ The only
3 exception the State is aware of is an opinion from the Maine Supreme Court holding
4 that ranked-choice voting was inconsistent with the Maine Constitution's direction that
5 the winner of an election was the candidate who "shall appear to have been elected by a
6 plurality of all votes returned."¹³⁹ The Court implicitly assumed that each individual
7 preference for a candidate constituted a distinct vote, and expressly assumed that use of
8 the term "plurality" meant that the Maine Constitution contemplated only one round of
9 counting votes—after which some candidate would be ahead with at least a plurality of
10 the votes; and that that candidate must be the winner.¹⁴⁰

13 But as explained above, and as the Ninth Circuit and several state courts have
14 recognized, a "vote" in a ranked-choice voting system consists of the full statement of
15 the voter's preferences—*i.e.* all the voter's rankings together, not each one separately—
16 and the votes have not been counted until the tabulation is complete. Thus, the Maine
17 court's analysis is not persuasive. And even if it were, Alaska's constitution does not
18 contain comparable "plurality" language. Indeed, the only office for which any vote
19

20
21 ¹³⁸ See *e.g.*, *McSweeney v. City of Cambridge*, 665 N.E.2d 11 (Mass. 1996); *Dudum*
22 *v. Arntz*, 640 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2011); *Minnesota Voters Alliance v. City of*
23 *Minneapolis*, 766 N.W.2d 683, 692 (Minn. 2009); *Baber v. Dunlap*, 376 F.Supp.3d 125
(D.Me. 2018).

24 ¹³⁹ *Opinion of the Justices*, 162 A.3d 188, 194 (Me. 2017) (quoting ME Const. Art.
25 IV, Part First, § 5).

26 ¹⁴⁰ *Id.* at 211 (characterizing amendments to the constitution as providing that "an
election is won by the candidate that first obtains 'a plurality of' all votes returned,"
although the phrase "first obtains" does not appear in the constitutional language.)

1 threshold is established in the constitution is the governor—in Article III, § 3. That
2 provision is discussed below.

3 Because ranked-choice voting does not burden any constitutional rights, the court
4 need not consider the rest of the balancing test. But if the court were to find that this
5 voting system does impose some burden on the right to vote, it is not severe and thus the
6 State need only show an important regulatory interest.¹⁴¹ The “Findings and Intent”
7 section of Ballot Measure 2 identifies the state interests as follows:
8

9 It is in the public interest of Alaska to adopt a general election system that
10 reflects the core democratic principle of majority rule. A ranked-choice
11 voting system will help ensure that the values of elected officials more
12 broadly reflect the values of the electorate, mitigate the likelihood that a
13 candidate who is disapproved by a majority of voters will get elected,
14 encourage candidates to appeal to a broader section of the electorate,
15 allow Alaskans to vote for the candidates that most accurately reflect their
16 values without risking the election of those candidates that least accurately
17 reflect their values, encourage greater third-party and independent
18 participation in elections, and provide a stronger mandate for winning
19 candidates.¹⁴²

20 These interests are more than sufficient to justify any minimal burden that
21 ranked-choice voting imposes on voters. After all, no voting system is perfect,¹⁴³ but
22 states must use some system for conducting elections. Single-choice voting with a
23 plurality threshold to win may be simple and easy to understand, but it can also result in
24

25 ¹⁴¹ *Dudum*, 640 F.3d at 1106 (“We have repeatedly upheld as “not severe”
26 restrictions that are generally applicable, even-handed, politically neutral, and ... protect
the reliability and integrity of the election process.”)

¹⁴² Exhibit A, § 1(5).

¹⁴³ *Dudum*, 640 F.3d at 1103 (citing David M. Farrell, *Electoral Systems: A
Comparative Introduction* 47 (2001)).

1 the victory of a candidate whom the majority of voters strongly disfavor or a candidate
2 who wins only a small minority of votes in a big field or both.¹⁴⁴ Ranked-choice voting
3 may be slightly more complicated—and that appears to be the basis for Kohlhaas’s
4 speculative claim that “Proposition 2 would disproportionately harm rural, particularly
5 Alaskan native, communities”¹⁴⁵—but it allows voters to “express nuanced voting
6 preferences and elect[] candidates with strong plurality support.”¹⁴⁶ Weighing the
7 advantages and disadvantages of a voting system is a quintessentially legislative
8 function and courts should not second-guess this sort of policy choice.
9

10
11 **D. Ballot Measure 2 does not violate Article III, §§ 3 and 8 of the Alaska
Constitution.**

12 Kohlhaas claims that the “election system implemented by Proposition 2 violates
13 [§§ 3 and 8] of Article III of the Constitution of the State of Alaska and is void as it
14 applies to the election of the governor and lieutenant governor.”¹⁴⁷ Article III, § 3 of the
15 Alaska Constitution provides that “[t]he governor shall be chosen by the qualified voter
16 of the State at a general election. The candidate receiving the greatest number of votes
17
18

19 ¹⁴⁴ *Dudum*, 640 F.3d at 1103.

20 ¹⁴⁵ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 19. This allegation appears to rest solely on an
21 editorial in the *Anchorage Daily News* speculating that rural, native voters will have
22 more trouble understanding ranked-choice voting than other voters in order to persuade
23 readers to vote against the initiative. But Kohlhaas can offer no evidence to confirm this
24 speculation because no election has yet been held using ranked-choice voting.

25 ¹⁴⁶ *Dudum*, 640 F.3d at 1116 (citing *Storer v. Brown*, 415 U.S. 724, 732 (1974)
26 (noting a state interest in “assur[ing] that the winner is the choice of a majority, or at
least a strong plurality, of those voting.”)). *See also*, *McSweeney*, 665 N.E.2d at 15
(noting that “a preferential scheme...seeks more accurately to reflect voter sentiment.”)

¹⁴⁷ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 24.

1 shall be governor.” And Article III, § 8 provides that candidates for governor and
2 lieutenant governor should run jointly as a single ticket in the general election and that
3 “[t]he candidate whose name appears on the ballot jointly with that of the successful
4 candidate for governor shall be elected lieutenant governor.”¹⁴⁸

5
6 Kohlhaas appears to be claiming that Ballot Measure 2 is inconsistent with the
7 constitutional directive that the candidate for governor—and by extension for lieutenant
8 governor—who wins the “greatest number of votes” shall be elected. But ranked-choice
9 voting does not produce winning candidates who have not received the “greatest
10 number of votes.” To the contrary, the winner is either the “candidate [who] is highest-
11 ranked on more than one-half of the active ballots” after the first round of
12 tabulation¹⁴⁹—in other words, a majority, which is by definition “the greatest
13 number”—or, “if two or fewer continuing candidates remain, the candidate with the
14 greatest number of votes.”¹⁵⁰

15
16 Presumably, Kohlhaas’s objection is that a candidate might receive more first-
17 choice rankings than any other candidate, but be defeated by another candidate after the
18 tabulation is complete. But as explained above, under the ranked-choice voting system a
19

20
21 ¹⁴⁸ Article III, § 8 provides in full: “The lieutenant governor shall be nominated in
22 the manner provided by law for nominating candidates for other elective offices. In the
23 general election the votes cast for a candidate for governor shall be considered as cast
24 also for the candidate for lieutenant governor running jointly with him. The candidate
whose name appears on the ballot jointly with that of the successful candidate for
governor shall be elected lieutenant governor.”

25 ¹⁴⁹ See AS 15.15.350(d).

26 ¹⁵⁰ See AS 15.15.350(d)(1).

1 “vote” consists of the voter’s *ranking of all the candidates*, not just the voter’s first
2 choice. So until all the rankings have been tabulated, the “votes” have not been counted,
3 and there can be no candidate with “the greatest number of votes.”

4
5 The Alaska Constitution does not prescribe the use of a particular voting system,
6 instead expressly delegating that responsibility to the legislature or the people through
7 the initiative process: Article V, § 3 provides that “[m]ethods of voting, including
8 absentee voting, shall *be prescribed by law*.” [Emphasis added] It is, therefore, plainly
9 within the scope of the initiative power to adopt a new system of voting, like ranked-
10 choice voting, and ranked-choice voting is not inconsistent with the command of Article
11 III, §§ 3 or 8.

12
13 **E. Ballot Measure 2’s severability clause was not invalidated by the**
14 **Alaska Supreme Court’s single-subject ruling.**

15 Citing *Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections*,¹⁵¹ Kohlhaas also argues that
16 because voters “were forced to adopt or reject [the initiative] as a single entity..., its
17 provisions are not separable, notwithstanding” the initiative’s severability clause.¹⁵²
18 This is not the law. To the contrary, just as the Alaska Supreme Court applies the same
19 single-subject rule to initiatives as it does to the bills passed by the legislature,¹⁵³ it also
20 applies the same severability test to post-enactment initiatives as it does to legislatively-
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22
23
24 ¹⁵¹ 465 P.3d 477 (Alaska 2020)

25 ¹⁵² Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 20.

26 ¹⁵³ *Alaskans for Better Elections*, 465 P.3d at 497.

1 enacted statutes.¹⁵⁴ And under this test, each of Ballot Measure 2’s three reforms is
2 severable from the others. If Kohlhaas was correct that a bill that complies with the
3 single-subject rule could not be severed in any way, then no bill could contain
4 provisions that could be severed.

5
6 The Alaska Supreme Court has expressly held that the same test for severability
7 applies to any “enacted measure,” whether it was adopted by the legislature or the
8 people through an initiative.¹⁵⁵ The test “asks (1) whether ‘legal effect can be given’ to
9 the severed statute and (2) if ‘the legislature intended the provision to stand’ in the event
10 other provisions were struck down.”¹⁵⁶

11
12 Kohlhaas does not argue that legal effect cannot be given to any one of Ballot
13 Measure 2’s reforms if one of the others is found to be unconstitutional. Instead, he
14 suggests simply that the Alaska Supreme Court’s ruling in *Alaskans for Better*
15 *Elections*—that the initiative did not violate the single subject rule—means that its
16 provisions are “not separable.”¹⁵⁷

17
18 But the single-subject rule applies to all legislation, and the Alaska Supreme
19 Court has frequently severed unconstitutional provisions and allowed the rest of a
20
21

22 ¹⁵⁴ *Kritz*, 170 P.3d at 210 (“We conclude there is no compelling reason to apply a
23 different severability analysis to statutes enacted by the people from those enacted by
the legislature.”)

24 ¹⁵⁵ *Id.*

25 ¹⁵⁶ *Id.* (quoting *Lynden Transp., Inc. v. State*, 532 P.2d 700, 713 (Alaska 1975)).

26 ¹⁵⁷ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 20.

1 statute to go into effect.¹⁵⁸ It has also severed part of an initiative—after enactment—
2 and allowed the remainder to go into effect, contrary to Kohlhaas’s theory.¹⁵⁹

3 Even if Kohlhaas’s claim survived the first hurdle of the severability test, it
4 cannot survive the second because he has not even alleged that the voters did not intend
5 the individual reforms to stand, even if one or two were invalidated.¹⁶⁰ The complaint
6 speculates—but does not allege facts in support¹⁶¹—that if the reforms had been split
7 apart and voted on separately, they might not all have passed. But that is not the relevant
8 question. As the Alaska Supreme Court has explained, to meet the second prong of the
9 severability test, in a post-enactment challenge to an initiative that includes a
10 severability clause, “the burden is on the challengers to show that the voters *did not*
11 *intend the remaining provisions to be given effect.*”¹⁶²

12 Because the complaint argues that both the nonpartisan primary and ranked
13 choice voting are unconstitutional, it appears that the severability argument is directed
14 at the remaining reform requiring disclosure of the sources of “dark money.” But this is
15
16
17

18 ¹⁵⁸ See e.g., *Lynden Transport*, 532 P.2d at 715; *Sonneman v. Hickel*, 836 P.2d 936,
19 941 (Alaska 1992); *State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union*, 978 P.2d 597, 634-35 (Alaska
20 1999); see also, *Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State*, 202 P.3d 1162, 1176
21 (Alaska 2009) (holding one part of act severable and another not severable from
22 unconstitutional provision).

23 ¹⁵⁹ See e.g., *Kritz*, 170 P.3d 183.

24 ¹⁶⁰ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 20.

25 ¹⁶¹ *Id.* Although the complaint asserts that “most people *would have supported*
26 additional ‘dark money’ disclosure, while many *would oppose* either one or both the 4
winner primary or ranked choice voting,” it does not allege any factual basis for this
speculation.

¹⁶² *Kritz*, 170 P.3d at 211.

1 the one reform that the complaint appears to believe would have been supported by a
2 majority of voters if presented individually,¹⁶³ thus directly undermining any argument
3 that the voters would not have intended that reform to go into effect if the others were
4 stricken.

5
6 In sum, Kohlhaas's severability argument puts the cart before the horse by
7 asserting that the reforms of Ballot Measure 2 are not severable before he has
8 established that any one of those reforms is constitutionally infirm. And even more
9 importantly, he has not even attempted to meet his burden under the Alaska Supreme
10 Court's severability test. The Court should grant the defendants summary judgment on
11 the severability claim, ruling as a matter of law, that Ballot Measure 2's severability
12 clause was not invalidated by *State v. Alaskans for Better Elections*.

13
14 **V. Conclusion**

15 For these reasons, the Court should reject all of Kohlhaas's claims and grant
16 summary judgment to the State.

17 DATED April 2, 2021.

18
19 TREG R. TAYLOR
ATTORNEY GENERAL

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26 ¹⁶³ Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 20.